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THEORETICAL GEOMETRY, CRITICAL THEORY, AND
CONCEPT SPACES IN IR
LAURA SJOBERG AND KEVIN P. KNUDSON
Abstract. We use the theory of persistent homology to analyze a data
set arising from the study of various aspects of democracy. Our results
show that most “mature” democracies look more or less the same, in
the sense that they form a single connected component in the data
set, while more authoritarian countries cluster into groups depending
on various factors. For example, we find several distinct 2-dimensional
homology classes in the set, uncovering connections among the countries
representing the vertices in the representative cycles.
As was discussed in the introduction to this book, the quantitative meth-
ods traditionally used in the social sciences represent a limited subset of
available methods in mathematics, statistics, and computational analysis,
and the positivist ends for which they are usually deployed in the social
science community represent a limited subset of the purposes for which they
are intended and deployed in the philosophy of mathematics.
If it were to be oversimplified for explanatory purposes, math is the study
of patterns. Discrete (if such things exist) ones are arithmetic.1 Continuous
ones are geometry.2 Immeasurable ones are symbolic logic.3 Patterns not
dependent on the empirical existence of their component parts are formalist.4
In the philosophy-of-math sense, this chapter takes a formalist approach to
mathematical symbolism.5
Date: April 5, 2015.
1E.g., Aristotle. See discussion in Jonathan Lear, Aristotles Philosophy of Mathemat-
ics, The Philosophical Review 91(2) (1982):161-192.
2E.g., Euclid. See discussion in J. C. Fisher, Geometry According to Euclid, The
American Mathematical Monthly 86(4) (1979):260-270.
3E.g., Bertrand Russell, Mathematical Logic Based on the Theory of Types, American
Journal of Mathematics 30(3) (1908):222-262.
4E.g., Carl B. Boyer, Descartes and the Geometrization of Algebra, The American
Mathematical Monthly 66(5) (1959):390-393.
5With Alan Weir (in . 2011. Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathe-
matics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [2011] accessed 15 March 2014 at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formalism-mathematics/), such an approach does not
see mathematics as a body of propositions representing an abstract sector of reality, but
much more akin to a game, bringing with it no commitment to an ontology of objects or
properties. In this sense, formalists do not imply that these formulas are true statements
but instead see that such intelligibility as mathematics possesses derives from the syn-
tactical or metamathematical rules governing those marks. (Nelson Goodman and W. V.
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For the purpose of this analysis, that means that we argue that mathe-
matical work is axioms with rules of inference that make possible thought
experiments and string manipulation games of almost infinite complexity.
There is no true meaning underlying mathematical symbols instead equa-
tions, formalizations, and quantifications are representations from which
we learn about relationships -homologies, homeomorphisms, maps, dimen-
sionality, commutativity, factorization.6 In this view, the rules, laws, and
procedures of mathematics are socially constructed interested not only in
quantity but also in structure, space, change, stochasticity, relationality,
and formalization for its own sake. There are, for sure, many practition-
ers of math who think of it as science, as discovery, and as progress; but
there are also many practitioners of math who see it as art, as creation, as
signification, and as representation.7
The overwhelming majority of quantitative methods that are used in In-
ternational Relations (IR) are statistical in nature. When the tools of the-
oretical mathematics are used, they are most often deployed in predictive,
descriptive, or heuristic uses of game theory. That is, the tools of mathe-
matics are used to try to gain leverage on the causal empirical realities that
neopositivist IR scholars see as the important substance of global politics to
know and understand. In this chapter, we argue that, not only can the tools
of theoretical mathematics be utilized for post-positivist ends, but that is
where many of those tools would be most at home in IR.
Particularly, in this chapter, we look to make an initial case for the argu-
ment that the tools of computational topology can be effectively utilized to
explore questions of constitution, textuality, and performativity for critical
Quine, Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism, Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 [1947]:97-
122, 122, 111).
6In order to understand that assertion, it is important to distinguish, in discipline and
in substance, between statistics and mathematics. Statistics is representation of quantity
and correlation; mathematics is the spatial or equative representation of relationships,
particularly as they become increasingly (and even impossibly) complex. We contend
that critical theory wants that, and math can do it. Math can do spatial concept maps
of multidimensional, overlayered, folded, twisted manifolds of the stuff of politics. It can
represent the mess. It can even suggest tweaks, trades, changes, foldovers alterations to
the map. Imagine math like the Matrix but used to understand transparently rather than
manipulate. It is possible to look at this theoretical discussion as abstract, and impossible
to materialize. Thats an admitted weakness.
7e.g., Nathalie Sinclair The Role of the Aesthetic in Mathematical Inquiry, Mathemat-
ical Learning and Thinking 6(3) (2004):261-284; Edward A. Silver and Wendy Metzger,
Aesthetic Influences of Expert Mathematical Problem-Solving, in Douglas B. McLeod and
Verna M. Adams, eds. Affect and Mathematical Problem-Solving (New York: Springer,
1989), 59-74; Henri Poincare, Mathematical Creation, The Monist Volume XX (1910);
Gontran Ervynckm Mathematical Creativity, Advanced Mathematical Thinking 11 (1991):
42-53; Loren Graham and Jean-Michael Kantor, Naming Infinity: A True Story of Reli-
gious Mysticism and Mathematical Creativity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2009); Gian-Carlo Rota, The Phenomenology of Mathematical Beauty, Synthese 111(2)
(1997): 171-182; David Wells, Which is the Most Beautiful, The Mathematical Intelli-
gencer 10(4) (1988): 30-31.
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IR. To that end, the first section lays out an argument about the possible
utility of thinking geometrically about concept formation and reification for
post-structuralist IR, and possible ways to do that work. The second section
introduces the concept of democracy in IR, and argues that it might be pos-
sible to gain leverage on the dimensions of the concept using computational
topology to evaluate existing data. The third section shows the method
in action, and sketches out some of the possible ramifications for studying
democracy from a critical perspective. The concluding section makes a case
for the value-added both for political methodology and critical theory of
methodological explorations like this.
Critical IR and Geometry Topology
In Mark Hoffmans words, post-structuralist IR asks how questions, rather
than what or why questions.8 Those how questions include: how are struc-
tures and practices replicated? How is meaning fixed, questioned, reinter-
preted, and refixed?9 To answer these how questions, post-structuralist IR
rejects the modernist belief in our ability to rationally perceive and the-
orize the world in favor of dis-belief in unproblematic notions of moder-
nity, enlightenment, truth, science, and reason.10 This move leads post-
structuralists, methodologically, to a sort of scholarship which does not look
for a continuous history, but for discontinuity and forgotten meanings; it
does not look for an origin, indeed, it is assumed one cannot be found; and
it does not, finally, focus on the object of geneaology itself, but on the con-
ditions, discourses, and interpretations surrounding it.11 This scholarship
pays particular attention to discourses in global politics, where (actual and
conceptual) boundaries are constantly being redrawn and transgressed.12
We argue that this methodological approach can be matched fairly easily
with the capacities of the methods of geometric and computational topol-
ogy. If critical IR rejects the objective and the linear, and with them their
dichotomized frame of reference, topological analysis can accommodate sig-
nificantly more complexity. If critical IR tries to unmask and deconstruct
hidden meanings, there could be some power in representing those mean-
ings geometrically. If critical IR embraces undecidability, is at home with
liminality, is wary of metanarratives, and is attached to the how questions
discussed above, the instability, creativity, and formalism of theoretical ge-
ometry may be a good fit.
8Mark Hoffman, Critical Theory and the Interparadigm Debate, Millennium: Journal
of International Studies 16 (1987):231-249.
9Ibid.
10Lene Hansen, A Case for Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist Conceptializa-
tion of Security, Cooperation and Conflict Nordic Journal of International Studies 34(2)
(1997): XXXX.
11Ibid., p.372.
12Hoffman, Critical Theory and the Interparadigm Debate.
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In fact, this is not the first time a critical theorist has suggested that there
might be some benefit to thinking geometrically about the concepts being
explored and critiqued. Deleuze and Guattari see concepts as rhizomes,
biological entities endowed with unique properties.13 They see concepts as
spatially representable, where the representation contains principles of con-
nection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome must be connected to any
other.14 Deleuze and Guattari list the possible benefits of spatial representa-
tion of concepts, including the ability to represent complex multiplicity, the
potential to free a concept from foundationalism, and the ability to show
both breadth and depth.15 In this view, geometric interpretations move
away from the insidious understanding of the world in terms of dualisms,
dichotomies, and lines, to understand conceptual relations in terms of space
and shapes. The ontology of concepts is thus, in their view, appropriately
geometric a multiplicity defined not by its elements, nor by a center of
unification and comprehension and instead measured by its dimensionality
and its heterogeneity.16 The conceptual multiplicity, is already composed of
heterogeneous terms in symbiosis , and is continually transforming itself
such that it is possible to follow, and map, not only the relationships be-
tween ideas but how they change over time.17 In fact, the authors claim that
there are further benefits to geometric interpretations of understanding con-
cepts which are unavailable in other frames of reference. They outline the
unique contribution of geometric models to the understanding of contingent
structure: “Principle of cartography and decalcomania: a rhizome is not
amenable to any structural or generative model. It is a stranger to any idea
of genetic axis or deep structure. A genetic axis is like an objective pivotal
unity upon which successive stages are organized; deep structure is more
like a base sequence that can be broken down into immediate constituents,
while the unity of the product passes into another, transformational and
subjective, dimension.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 12)
13Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophre-
nia, translated by Brian Massumi. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
14Ibid., p. 7. As the authors continue on to explain: A rhizome ceaselessly establishes
connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative
to the arts, sciences, and social struggles. A semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating
very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive:
there is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of
dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized languages.
15Ibid., p.8.
16Ibid., p.267.
17Ibid.
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The word that Deleuze and Guattari use for ‘multiplicities’ can also be
translated to the topological term ‘manifold.’18 This is how we propose look-
ing at concepts: as manifolds. With such a dimensional understanding of
concept-formation, it is possible to deal with complex interactions of like en-
tities, and interactions of unlike entities. Critical theorists have emphasized
the importance of such complexity in representation a number of times,
speaking about it in terms compatible with mathematical methods if not
mathematically. For example, Michel Foucaults declaration that “practic-
ing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult both reflects and
is reflected in many critical theorists projects of revealing the complexity in
(apparently simple) concepts deployed both in global politics and IR schol-
arship.19 David Campbell’s reading of the state in Writing Security is a good
example of this: Campbell makes the argument that the notion of the state
appears to be both simple and a priori, it is really danger built over other
danger–where “the constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is
thus not a threat to a states identity or existence: it is its condition of possi-
bility.20 This leads to a shift in the concept of danger as well, where “danger
is not an objective condition but “an effect of interpretation.21 Critical think-
ing about how-possible questions reveals a complexity to the concept of the
state which is often overlooked in traditional analyses, sending a wave of
added complexity through other concepts as well. This work seeking com-
plexity serves one of the major underlying functions of critical theorizing:
finding invisible injustices in (modernist, linear, structuralist) givens in the
operation and analysis of global politics.
In a geometric sense, this complexity could be thought about as mul-
tidimensional mapping. In theoretical geometry, the process of mapping
conceptual spaces is “not primarily empirical22 but for the purpose of repre-
senting and reading the relationships between information, including iden-
tification, similarity, differentiation, and distance.23 The reason for defining
topological spaces in math, the essence of the definition, is that there is no
18If we thought about their multiplicities as manifolds, there are a virtually unlimited
number of things one could come to know, in geometric terms, about (and with) our object
of study, abstractly speaking. Among those unlimited things we could learn are proper-
ties of groups (homological, cohomological, and homeomorphic), complex directionality
(maps, morphisms, isomorphisms, and orientability), dimensionality (codimensionality,
structure, embeddedness), partiality (differentiation, commutativity, simultaneity), and
shifting representation (factorization, ideal classes, reciprocity). Each of these functions
allows for a different, creative, and potentially critical representation of global politics
concepts, events, groupings, and relationships.
19Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture (New York: Routledge, 1988), p.154.
20David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of
Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p.10.
21Ibid., p.1, 2.
22Peter Gardenfors, Mental Representation, Conceptual Spaces, and Metaphors, Syn-
these 106(1) (1996): 21-47.
23Janet Aisbett and Greg Gibbon, A General Formulation of Conceptual Spaces as
Meso-Level Representation, Artificial Intelligence, 133 (2001): 189-232, p.190.
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absolute scale for describing the distance or relation between certain points,
yet it makes sense to say that an (infinite) sequence of points approaches
some other (but again, no way to describe ‘how quickly or ‘from what direc-
tion one might be approaching). This seemingly weak relationship, which
is defined purely ‘locally, i.e., in a small locale around each point, is often
surprisingly powerful: using only the relationship of ‘approaching parts, one
can distinguish between, say, a balloon, a sheet of paper, a circle, and a dot.
To each delineated concept, one should distinguish and associate a topo-
logical space, in a (necessarily) non-explicit yet definite manner. Whenever
one has a relationship between concepts (here we think of the primary re-
lationship as being that of constitution, but not restrictively, we ‘specify’ a
function (or inclusion, or relation) between the topological spaces associated
to the concepts). In these terms, “a conceptual space is in essence a mul-
tidimensional space in which the dimensions represent qualities or features
of that which is being represented.24 Such an approach can be leveraged for
thinking about conceptual components, dimensionality, and structure.25 In
these terms, dimensions can be thought of as properties or qualities, each
with their own (often-multidimensional) properties or qualities.26
A key goal of the modeling of conceptual space being representation means
that a key (mathematical and theoretical) goal of concept space mapping is
“associationism, where associations between different kinds of information
elements carry the main burden of representation.”27 To this end, “objects
in conceptual space are represented by points, in each domain, that charac-
terize their dimensional values.”28 These dimensional values can be arranged
in relation to each other, as Gardenfors explains that “distances represent
degrees of similarity between objects represented in space” and therefore
conceptual spaces are “suitable for representing different kinds of similar-
ity relation.”29 These similarity relationships can be explored across ideas
of a concept and across contexts, but also over time, since “with the aid
of a topological structure, we can speak about continuity, e.g., a contin-
uous change” a possibility which can be found only in treating concepts
as topological structures and not in linguistic descriptions or set theoretic
representations.30 Such an approach is both complex and anexact suiting it
well for the contingent explorations of critical IR.
24Ibid., p.192.
25Gardenfors, Mental Representation, p.33.
26Aisbett and Gibbon, A General Formulation of Conceptual Spaces, p.192.
27Peter Gardenfors, Conceptual Spaces as a Framework for Knowledge Representation,
Mind and Matter 2(2) (2004): 9-27, p.9.
28John T. Rickard, A Conceptual Geometry for Conceptual Space, Fuzzy Optimum
Decision Making 5 (2006): 311-329 (original emphasis removed).
29Peter Gardenfors, Conceptual Learning: A Geometrical Model, Meeting of the Aris-
totelian Society, University of London, Senate House, 5 February 2001, p.169.
30Thomas Mormann, Natural Predicates and Topological Structures of Conceptual
Spaces, Synthese 95(2) (1993): 219-240, p.220.
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A Formalization of Concept Relationships
The first step might be to gain information about the (actual, represen-
tational, or potential) relationship between a concept being examined and
another concept that contributes something to the essence of how it is un-
derstood. Assume a complex concept K composed of (but not necessarily
limited to) component parts v0, v1, . . . , vp. The concept can be explored as
a simplicial homology, where an abstract simplicial complex K is specified
by the following data:
• A vertex set V ;
• A rule specifying when a p-simplex σ = [v0v1 . . . vp] belongs to K;
here the vertices v0, v1, . . . , vp are distinct elements of V ;
• Each p-simplex σ has p + 1 faces which are the (p − 1)-simplices
obtained by deleting one of the vertices of σ. The membership rule
has the property that if σ belongs to K, then all of its faces belong
to K.
Given a simplicial complex K, we wish to define a collection of vector
spaces which tell us the number of holes of various dimensions in K. Be-
fore defining these objects formally, let us consider some simple examples.
Let T be a hollow tetrahedron; topologically, this is a sphere. Observe
that any simple closed loop on the surface of T bounds a disc. This means
that there are no one-dimensional loops in T that cannot be filled in by a
two-dimensional surface in T . There is a two-dimensional surface, though,
namely T itself, that cannot be filled in without leaving T . The corre-
sponding homology vector spaces would then be zero-dimensional in degree
1 (every loop bounds a disc), and one-dimensional in degree 2 (there is a
two-dimensional surface in T that is not filled in by a three-dimensional
object). By contrast, consider the surface S of a donut. This also has a
three-dimensional void (the interior of S), but it also has some loops that
do not bound discs on S—choose any meridian and any longitude. The
degree 1 homology space would then have dimension 2.
The formal definition is as follows. Let k be the field of 2 elements. The i-
th homology group, Hi(K; k), will measure the number of (i+1)-dimensional
voids, and it is constructed as follows. Let Ci(K; k) be the k-vector space
with basis the set of i-simplices in K. If σ = [v0v1 · · · vi] is such a simplex,
we define ∂σ to be the element of Ci−1(K; k) given by the formula
∂σ =
i∑
j=0
(−1)j [v0v1 · · · vˆj · · · vi],
where [v0v1 · · · vˆj · · · vi] is the (i−1)-simplex with vertices {v0, . . . , vi}−{vj}.
Note that in the field of 2 elements we have −1 = 1, but we present the
definition this way because it works over any field (e.g., the real numbers).
We may extend this linearly to Ci(K; k) to obtain a linear transformation
∂i : Ci(K; k)→ Ci−1(K; k).
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It is a straightforward exercise to show that ∂i ◦ ∂i+1 = 0 and hence
im(∂i+1) ⊆ null(∂i) (null(∂i) denotes the null space of the map ∂i). We
then define the i-th homology group as
Hi(K; k) = null(∂
i)/im(∂i+1).
Elements of null(∂i) are called cycles; the set of all such is denoted by
Zi. Elements of im(∂
i+1) are called boundaries, denoted by Bi. Homology
measures how many cycles are inequivalent and essential in the sense that
they do not bound an object of higher dimension. Note that the group H0
measures how many connected components the space K has.
For computational purposes, the goal is to pay attention to the Betti
numbers, βi, defined as βi = dimkHi(K; k). Note that we have the simple
equation
βi = dimk Zi − dimk Bi+1
= dimk Ci − rank ∂i − rank ∂i+1.
This therefore reduces the calculation of Betti numbers to computing ranks
of matrices over the field k.
As a simple example, consider the tetrahedron T . There are four vertices
v0, v1, v2, v3; six edges [v0v1], [v0v2], [v0v3], [v1v2], [v1v3], [v2v3]; and four
faces [v0v1v2], [v0v1v3], [v0v2v3], [v1v2v3]. The groups Ci(T ; k) are then
C0(T ; k) = k
4 C1(T ; k) = k
6 C2(T ; k) = k
4
and the maps ∂i are given by ∂0 = 0, ∂i = 0, i ≥ 3, and
∂1 =

−1 −1 −1 0 0 0
1 0 0 −1 −1 0
0 1 0 1 0 −1
0 0 1 0 1 1

∂2 =

1 1 0 0
−1 0 1 0
0 −1 −1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 −1
0 0 1 1
 .
An easy calculation shows that rank ∂1 = 3, rank ∂2 = 3, and therefore that
H0(T ; k) = k ⇒ β0 = 1
H1(T ; k) = 0 ⇒ β1 = 0
H2(T ; k) = k ⇒ β2 = 1.
A basis for H0(T ; k) is [v0], and for H2(T ; k), [v0v1v2]− [v0v1v3] + [v0v2v3]−
[v1v2v3]. There are three linearly independent 1-cycles—the boundaries of
the four triangles form a linearly dependent set of dimension 3—but each is
also a boundary, filled in by the interior of the triangle. Geometrically, the
fact that β0 = 1 means that T is connected; β1 = 0 means that every loop
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in T bounds a disc; β2 = 1 means that T contains a closed surface, namely
T itself, that is not filled in by a 3-dimensional object.
Homology groups are topological invariants; that is, if spaces X and Y are
homotopy equivalent (one may be deformed to the other), then H•(X; k) ∼=
H•(Y ; k). They therefore provide a means to distinguish spaces, although
it is possible for topologically distinct spaces to have the same homology
groups.
Tools for analyzing homology groups then can be used for similarity and
difference analysis in these concept spaces. An increasingly popular tech-
nique for analyzing data sets topologically is the persistent homology of
Edelsbrunner, Letscher, and Zomorodian.31 The idea is as follows. Sup-
pose we are given a finite nested sequence of finite simplicial complexes
KR1 ⊂ KR2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ KRp ,
where the Ri are real numbers R1 < R2 < · · · < Rp. For each homological
degree ` ≥ 0, we then obtain a sequence of homology groups and induced
linear transformations
H`(KR1)→ H`(KR2)→ · · · → H`(KRp).
Since the complexes are finite, each H`(KRi) is a finite-dimensional vector
space. Thus, there are only finitely many distinct homology classes. A
particular class z may come into existence in H`(KRs), and then one of
two things happens. Either z maps to 0 (i.e., the cycle representing z gets
filled in) in some H`(KRt), Rs < Rt, or z maps to a nontrivial element in
H`(KRp). This yields a barcode, a collection of interval graphs lying above
an axis parametrized by R. An interval of the form [Rs, Rt] corresponds to a
class that appears at Rs and dies at Rt. Classes that live to KRp are usually
represented by the infinite interval [Rs,∞) to indicate that such classes are
real features of the full complex KRp .
As an example, consider the tetrahedron T with filtration
T0 ⊂ T1 ⊂ T2 ⊂ T3 ⊂ T4 ⊂ T5 = T
defined by T0 = {v0, v1, v2, v3}, T1 = T0 ∪ {all edges}, T2 = T1 ∪ [v0v1v2],
T3 = T2 ∪ [v0v1v3], T4 = T3 ∪ [v0v2v3], and T5 = T . The barcodes for this
filtration are shown in Figure 1. Note that initially, there are 4 components
(β0 = 4), which get connected in T1, when 3 independent 1-cycles are born
(β1 = 3). These three 1-cycles die successively as triangles get added in
T2, T3, and T4. The addition of the final triangle in T5 creates a 2-cycle
(β2 = 1). We see that the classes that ‘live forever’ yield the Betti numbers
discussed above.
This approach can be used to sketch out relationships among concepts
without data about how they are traditionally considered, or to analyze the
31Herbert Edelsbrunner; David Letscher; and Afra Zomordian, Topological Persistence
and Simplification, Discrete & Computational Geometry 28 (2002): 511-533.
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Figure 1. The barcodes for a filtration of the tetrahedron.
constitution of concepts for which point cloud data is collected. For analyz-
ing point cloud data, one needs a simplicial complex modeling the underlying
space. Since it is impossible to know a priori if a complex is “correct”, one
builds a nested family of complexes approximating the data cloud, computes
the persistent homology of the resulting filtration, and looks for homology
classes that exist in long sections of the filtration. A popular technique for
this is the witness complex construction of de Silva and Carlsson.32
Suppose there is a data set Z. Choose a subset L ⊆ Z; we call the
elements of L landmarks. Say Z has N elements and L has n elements and
denote by D the n×N matrix of distances between the elements of L and
the elements of Z. Fix a real number R > 0. The witness complex W (D,R)
is defined as follows.
(1) The vertex set of W (D,R) is {1, 2, . . . , n}.
(2) The edge σ = [ab] belongs to W (D,R) if and only if there exists a
data point 1 ≤ i ≤ N such that
max(D(a, i), D(b, i)) ≤ R.
In this case the point i is called a witness for σ.
(3) The p-simplex σ = [a0a1 . . . ap] belongs to W (D,R) if and only if
all its edges belong to W (D); equivalently, there exists a witness
1 ≤ i ≤ N such that
max(D(a0, i), D(a1, i), . . . , D(ap, i)) ≤ R.
32V. de Silva and G. Carlsson, Topological Estimation Using Witness Complexes, Sym-
posium on Point-Based Graphics, ETH, Zurich, Switzerland, June 2-4, 2004.
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This definition may seem a bit opaque, but can be described geometrically
as follows. Imagine the data set Z lies in some Euclidean space. We then
have the collection L of landmarks and we build a simplicial complex with
vertex set L by looking for points in the data set near the landmarks. Two
landmarks are joined by an edge precisely when there is a data point in Z
within R of both of them. In fact, if we take L = Z, then this process yields
the Rips complex on Z (with parameter R/2) in which two data points are
joined when their distance apart is at most R/2. A good image to keep
in mind for the Rips complex is that we place small balls of radius r > 0
around each data point. We join two data points if the balls meet. That this
is a good thing to do from a topological point of view is well-established.33
In the examples we analyze in this paper, we take L = Z and therefore
compute the Rips complex on the underlying data set. For larger data sets,
however, it is often impractical to build a simplicial complex on the entire
set and one therefore turns to the witness complex construction on a much
smaller subset of landmarks. We refer the reader to de Silva and Carlsson
(2004) for an analysis of the effectiveness of this process.
Note that the construction of W (D,R) takes a part of its input the pa-
rameter R. This allows us to construct a filtered collection of complexes
by letting R increase from 0 to some large upper bound. Note that if R
is sufficiently large, the complex W (D,R) contains all possible simplices on
the landmark set and is therefore a contractible (n − 1)-simplex. However,
each simplex σ comes into existence at some particular value Rσ, called
its time of appearance. Since there are only finitely many simplices possi-
ble on any landmark set, there is a discrete collection of parameter values
0 < R1 < R2 < · · · < Rr for which we get distinct witness complexes
L = W (D, 0) ⊂W (D,R1) ⊂ · · · ⊂W (D,Rr).
We may then compute the persistent homology of this filtration, searching
for homology classes that persist for long intervals [Rs, Rt].
In this way, analysis of persistent homologies can be used to show both
similarities among concepts and similarities across components of concepts
in particular cases to which those concepts and their components are applied.
For critical IR, mapping conceptual spaces like this can provide a “frame-
work for representation” that demonstrates relationships among concepts
without reaching necessary or essential conclusions about their genesis or
origin (Gardenfors 1996). Analyzing the geometric complexity of concepts
could lead to the ability to gain leverage on how understanding concep-
tual dimensionality could make current research better, more interesting,
or deeper, either on its own terms or in terms of understanding complex-
ity, hybridity, marginalization, social disadvantages, or other areas of global
politics of interest to critical theory.
33See, e.g., James Munkres, Elements of Algebraic Topology (Menlo Park, CA: Ben-
jamin/Cummings, 1984).
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Thinking Critically about Democracy
Scholars in Comparative Politics and IR have long been interested in the
nature and existence of democracy in the global political arena. Scholars of
Comparative Politics investigate the structure and function of democratic
institutions in states that they see as transitioning to democracy and in
states they see as developing or mature democracies. Scholars of IR look to
understand the ways in which states regime types may affect their foreign
policy propensities, including but not limited to trade patterns, likelihood
to be involved in conflict, and conflict opponents.
Scholars in Comparative Politics and International Relations make a num-
ber of common assumptions about democracy that permeate a significant
amount of the research which is read, cited, and engaged in their respective
fields. Each assumes that democracy is an extant and practiced form of
government. Each assumes that such a form of government is measurably
different than other forms of government, which may vary but share the
label non-democratic. Though not all scholars make the assumption that
democracy is a more desirable form of government than autocracy, oligarchy,
theocracy, or other possible forms of government, many if not most of them
do.
That said, while scholars interested in either the internal or external poli-
tics of either democracies or democratizing states agree on the existence and
distinguishability of democracy, many of them disagree on the components
of democracy which are distinguishable, or on the specific places and times
in which democracy exists. In other words, while the idea of democracy is
common among scholars interested in comparative or international politics,
many of them disagree on what makes a democracy, which countries are
democracies, which components of democracy are measurable, and which
measurable components of democracy are most central to the concept of
democracy.
Critical theorists have been interested in the concept of democracy in the
international arena in a number of different ways for an extended period
of time. Of course, neither the breadth nor theoretical depth of critical
analyses of democracy (even in IR) can be done justice in this small section
of a chapter. That said, some of the common critiques (and resultant how-
possible questions) can be explored briefly to give a sense of what the stake(s)
in the concept of democracy may be for (different) critical IR researchers.
Critical theorists have been concerned with the meaning of the concept of
democracy, about the structure and normative value of the signification of
the concept, and about the potential to revise and reappropriate the concept
in search of a more just global political arena.
Some critical theorists have been interested in the way that democracy as
a concept signifies the success of ‘the West’ and distinguishes that from an
othered rest of the world. As Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan note, “the
contemporary equivalent of ‘good life’ in international relations democratic
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peace, interdependence and integration, and institutionalized orderliness, as
well as the ‘normal relationships and calculable results’ is mostly found
in the West, while the non-West remains the realm of survival.”34 Accord-
ingly Acharya and Buzan characterize democracy as a “Western idea.”35 As
Fabrizio Eva notes, these origins hold in contemporary global politics, and
“the model for democracy nevertheless remains the Western version, which
is tied in with capitalist economics. There is an acceptance, therefore, of
the central ideology of liberal democracy.”36 Many critical theorists con-
cern with the Western-centric nature of deployed concepts of democracy in
the international arena causes them (especially those interested in the ques-
tion from a postcolonial perspective) to be critical of the use of the idea of
democracy writ large in global politics or the analysis thereof. For example,
Inayatullah and Blaney argue that “democracy is less a form of governance
than a value that must be moderated, a set of practices to be disciplined
by some prior claim to authority.”37 Another reading of this analysis might
suggest that democracy is not a thing out there to be analyzed, achieved,
or deconstructed, but instead a signifier by which participants in the global
political arena are organized hierarchically.
Roxanne Doty sees this both in the policy arena and in the academic study
of democracy.38 Doty explains that work in IR interested in democracy of-
ten presumes that “some subjects were definers, delimiters, and boundary
setters of important and that others not capable themselves of making such
definitions, would have things bestowed upon them and would be permitted
to enjoy them only under the circumstances deemed suitable by the United
States.”39 This is why Tanji and Lawson argue that “the ‘answer’ to the
question of what constitutes ‘true democracy’ is implicit in the model of
democracy assumed by the thesis [which is] authoritatively assumed in ad-
vance, posited as an unassailable universal, and deployed as the foundation
of the moral high ground in the global sphere.”40 These readings suggest a
critical stance not only towards current concepts of and wieldings of democ-
racy, but also towards the use of the word and idea in general. This work
in critical IR, then, is less concerned with reviving and rehabilitating the
34Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, Why Is There No Non-Western International Re-
lations Theory? An Introduction, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7(3) (2007):
287-312, p.288, citing J. M. Goldgeier and M. McFaul, A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and
Periphery in the post-Cold War Era, International Organization 46(2) (1992): 467-491.
35Ibid., p.295.
36Ibid., p.295.
37Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of
Difference (New York and London: Routledge, 2004).
38Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-
South Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p.135.
39Ibid.
40Miyume Tanji and Stephanie Lawson, Democratic Peace and Asian Democracy: A
Universalist-Particularist Tension, Alternatives 22(1) (1997): 135-155, p.151. See discus-
sion in Inayatullah and Blaney, The Problem of Difference.
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notion of democracy in global politics and more concerned with remedying
the exclusions and silences produced by its current significations.
Still, even the most skeptical of critical theorists pay attention to the
multiple significations of the term and idea of democracy in global poli-
tics. Doty draws on Laclaus use of the signifier of democracy, explaining
that it “acquires particular meanings when it is associated with other signi-
fiers,” that is, that anticommunist democracy and antifascist democracy are
signified differently, even if each is “an attempt to constitute a hegemonic
formation.”41 Internally linked significations include democracys perceived
opponents and its perceived components and benefits. For example, Doty
suggests that American masculinity is a key component and tie-in to 19th
century notions of democracy in global politics, where “American manhood
was also linked to democracy” and “this link served to construct a distinctly
American version of masculinity that was part and parcel of American excep-
tionalism.”42 In other words, democracy and masculinity were co-constituted
in a particular instantiation of democracy in global politics. More recently,
Zalewski and Runyan suggest that the signification of democracy has come
to be tied to how states treat their women, where gender quotas have been
“enacted by a range of states as a sign of democracy and a method for re-
ducing government corruption.”43 Richard Ashley suggests that democracy
can also be conceptually linked with its goals, using the democratic peace
as an example.44 Ashley explains that the “academically certified version
of the democratic peace has led to a securitization of democracy” which is
deeply problematic.45 Andrew Linklater, on the other hand, suggests that
it is the tie to Western liberalism that can be most insidious for the concept
of democracy, and advocates for theorizing democracy “without assuming
that Western liberal democracy is the model of government which should
apply universally.”46
While many critical theorists agree that, in a variety of ways, the no-
tion of democracy that is deployed in contemporary global politics and in
contemporary IR research is both empirically and normatively problematic,
they disagree strongly on how to handle it. Some suggest that the concept
of democracy is now itself part of the problem (perhaps what Baudrillard
41Doty, Imperial Encounters, pp. 8-9.
42Ibid., p.31.
43Marysia Zaleweski and Anne Runyan, Taking Feminist Violence Seriously in Interna-
tional Relations, International Feminist Journal of Politics 15(3) (2013): 293-313, p.299.
44Richard K. Ashley, Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy
Problematique, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17(2) (1988): 227-262.
45Ibid.
46Andrew Linklater, The Achievements of Critical Theory, in Ken Booth, Steve Smith,
and Marysia Zalewski, eds., International Relations Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 279-300, p.294.
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in The Mirror of Production would call a repressive simulation), while oth-
ers are interested in reviving a different understanding of democracy.47 For
example, Bieler and Morton suggest that the problem is not the concept
of democracy itself, but the hollowing of that concept.48 They argue that
there is a politics of supremacy that has come to replace democracy which
“involves a hollowing out of democracy and the affirmation, in matters of
political economy, of a set of macro-economic policies such as market effi-
ciency, discipline and confidence, policy credibility and competitiveness.”49
Some critical IR theorists, then, look to rescue the concept of democracy
from that hollowness.
For example, Ken Booth (2007: 55, citing Murphy 2001: 67) suggests that
what unifies critical theory in IR “in addition to its post-Marxist sensibility,
is democracy. Craig Murphy got it exactly right when he saw this emerging
critical theory project being ‘today’s manifestation of a long-standing demo-
cratic impulse in the academic study of international affairs.’ In other words,
it was academes contribution to ‘egalitarian practice.’”50 To follow up, Booth
goes over a number of different types of possible democracy, arguing that
finding a good notion of democracy is key to the emancipatory mission he
attributes to critical IR. Booth explains that “there will be no emancipatory
community without dialogue, no dialogue without democracy.”51 In emanci-
patory critical theorists terms, though, this is a different type of democracy,
one that “begins with greater recognition, representation, and access within
existing institutions and demands new mechanisms for popular control of
local, global, and security issues.”52 Following William Connolly, Richard
Shapcott describes the democracy favored by critical IR as “a democratic
ethos” which is “an ethos of pluralisation” focused on creating room for dif-
ference.53 This leads Shapcott to express interest in “an attempt to provide
an account of democracy that does not privilege the ‘abstract’ other and a
universal subjectivity or the territorial restrictions of the nation-state.”54
47Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production (Candor, NY: Telos Press Publishing,
1975).
48Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony,
World Order, and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Rela-
tions, Capital & Class 82 (2004): 85-113, p.97.
49Ibid.
50Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), p.55, citing Craig N. Murphy, Critical Theory and the Democratic Impulse: Un-
derstanding a Century-Old Tradition, in Richard Wyn-Jones, Critical Theory and World
Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 61-76.
51Ibid, p. 272.
52Alison Brysk, From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International
Relations in Latin America (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p.293.
53Richard Shapcott, Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Pressm 2001), p.70.
54Ibid, p. 69.
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While the dividing line is not perfect, it might be worth thinking about
these differences in terms of poststructuralist and emancipatory critical the-
ory. Both argue that there are problematic significations of current deploy-
ments of the notion of democracy in global politics. The latter is interested
in reviving a more just concept of democracy, where the former is more in-
terested in mapping the injustice that may well be inherent in the utterance
and reification of the concept. What both share, in addition to critiquing
current instantiations of the concept, is an interest in how democracy is
being constituted, read, reproduced, and reified as a concept, both among
states in global politics and among scholars of global politics interested in
understanding state (and non-state) interaction. It is possible, then, to find
a number of how-possible questions in critical IR analyses of democracy.
What are the conditions of possibility of current understandings of what
constitutes democracy? How are the indicators of democracy that are rec-
ognized by various scholars and policy makers chosen to the exclusion of
those which are not recognized? What are the relationships between var-
ious (recognized and unrecognized) indicators of democracy? How is the
concept of democracy deployed (and deployable) for (and against) certain
political interests? What if anything is it about the idea of democracy that
allows for hollowing, encroachment, supremacy, and/or Western dominance,
if such moves happen? How are relationships between the concept of democ-
racy and its antagonists, its component parts, and/or its results formed and
cemented? What is possible (or impossible) with particular conceptions of
what democracy is that could change with the change (or even elimination)
of the idea?
Certainly, answers to these how-possible questions cannot be supplied
easily with extant research, much less in the scope of this chapter. That
said, what the how-possible questions listed above share is an interest in how
democracy is being read across a variety of audiences in a variety of different
ways. The remainder of this chapter suggests the plausibility and particular
advantages of the formalization of concept relationships for gaining leverage
on different questions about how democracy is being read.
Mapping Interpretations of Democracy
We collected more than 100 indicators used to measure democracy over
eight datasets in order to gain interpretive leverage over what political sci-
entists tend to think democracy is, how they tend to measure it, and how
countries come to be classified as democracies and non-democracies.55
55The datasets that we compiled include the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
(http://www.cses.org, accessed 2 April 2015), Coppedges Democracy Diffusion data
(used in Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge, Diffusion is No Illusion: Neighbor
Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy, Comparative Political Studies 39(4)
(2006): 463-489); Democracy Barometer (Democracybarometer.org, accessed 2 April
2015; Wolfgang Merkel and Daniel Bochsler, (project leaders); Karima Bousbah; Marc
Buhlmann; Heiko Giebler; Miriam Hahni; Lea Heyne; Lisa Muller; Saskia Ruth;
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For the purposes of our pilot analysis, we used 14 of the variables for
a particular year to map country-data-points and look for commonalities.
The variables that we used were from the Polity IV and Miller-Boix-Rosato
datasets. From the Polity IV dataset, we used chief executive recruitment
regulation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive
recruitment, executive constraints, participation regulation, participation
competitiveness, as well as concept indicators for executive recruitment,
executive constraint, and political competition. We used these executive-
specific, individual level variables next to the Miller-Boix-Rosato macro-
level variables about democratic status and change over time, including a
dichotomous measure of democracy, a measure of sovereignty, a measure of
democratic transition, the previous number of democratic breakdowns, and
the duration of democracy in the state (consecutive years of a particular
regime type).
Geometrically, there are a number of countries that represent the same
point that is that their values on all 14 included indicators are the same.56
For the purposes of differing interpretations of what democracy is and the
indicators of democracy, then, the countries that represent the same data
point are flat: they represent the same configuration of indicators, defi-
nitions, variables, and conclusions for the purposes of understanding the
dimensionality of the concept of democracy. Using the 14 indicators that
we selected in the test-year of 2007, we find 88 unique data points that is,
88 different configurations of the 14 variables. We then looked to analyze
the relationships between those data points geometrically.
Bernhard Wessels,. Democracy Barometer. Codebook. Version 4.1. (Aarau: Zentrum
fur Demokratie, 2014); Varieties of Democracy (https://v-dem.net, accessed 2 April
2015; Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman,
Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen,
Matthew Kroenig, Kelly McMann, Daniel Pemstein, Megan Reif, Svend-Erik Skaaning,
Jeffrey Staton, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang. 2015. Varieties of Democracy Codebook
v4. Varieties of Democracy Project: Project Documentation Paper Series; Freedom
House (https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VSFsXFxYyBU,
accessed 2 April 2015); Miller-Boix-Rosato Dichotomous Codings of Democracy
(Carles Boix, Michael K. Miller, and Sebastian Rosato. A Complete Data Set
of Political Regimes, 1800-2007. Comparative Political Studies 46(12): 1523-54);
Pippa Norris Democracy Time-Series Dataset (http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/
pnorris/Data/Democracy\%20TimeSeries\%20Data/Codebook\%20for\%20Democracy\
%20Time-Series\%20Dataset\%20January\%202009.pdf, accessed 2 April 2015),
Polity IV (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html, accessed 2 April
2015), Vanhanens Polyarchy Dataset (https://www.prio.org/Data/Governance/
Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/, accessed 2 April 2015), World Governance In-
dicators compiled by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home, accessed 2 April
2015); and Unified Democracy Score (Daniel Pemstein, Stephen A. Meserve, and James
Melton, Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime
Type, Political Analysis 18[4] [2010] 426-449).
56Some of these indicators are dichotomous, and some are on a one-to-ten scale.
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Figure 2. The barcodes for the 14-dimensional data
Using the javaplex package in Matlab, we computed the persistent ho-
mology of the Rips complex for the 88 data points. The topology of that
Rips complex shows a number of distinct features. First, there are 10 con-
nected components, represented by the U.S., Cuba, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Equatorial Guinea, Swaziland, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Togo, Tanzania,
and Guinea. A connected component is a maximal subset of a space that
cannot be covered by the union of two disjoint open sets in other words,
it is a distinct and distinguishable group. Eight of those connected com-
ponents are contractible that means that they have stronger relationships
than non-contractible connected components would.57 The barcodes for the
relationships between datapoints can be seen in Figure 2.
What these barcodes represent is the durability of certain relationships
over the addition of data-points in the construction of a multi-dimensional
space descriptive of the concept of democracy through collected data about
its indicators. Within the topology of the data what we analyzed, there are
seven two-dimensional spheres. Six of them lie in the connected component
represented by the Dominican Republic while the seventh lies in the com-
ponent represented by Swaziland. The representatives of components are
the states that have the most in common with the most states within the
geometric component, so they matter a little as signifiers. Here, Domini-
can Republic is generally considered a durable if imperfect democracy, and
Swaziland is generally considered autocratic.
57Formally, because the identity map between them is null-homotopic. As a result, in
theory, a contractible space could be shrunk to a point.
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Some of the shapes formed, then, have both clear relationships and clear
implications about what ideas of democracy might be within the limitations
of our truncated pilot study. Tetrahedrons formed by the Dominican Repub-
lic, Albania, Latvia, and Botswana and by the Dominican Republic, Latvia,
Botswana, and Comoros are groupings of democracies with some durability
and sustainability, but with (perceived) weakness on one or more indica-
tors here, largely, either indicators that have to do with the availability and
health of political competition, or having had a democratic breakdown in
the past. In this sense, they are differentiable from the democracies that
constitute a single point both in theory empirically (assuming the measure-
ments are accurate) and conceptually (that is, that there is a substantive
difference about what sort of democracy a state is based on a difference on
those indicators). Another tetrahedron is composed of Paraguay, Ukraine,
Malawi, and East Timor. Using their Polity IV Scores (not included in the
geometric analysis), those countries are considered democracies, but do not
score as strongly as other countries on the democracy scale. Polity IV scores
range from −10 (purely autocratic) to +10 (understood as a full democracy),
but many studies that analyze democratic behavior require a score of +6 or
higher to consider a country as a democracy. These four states often rank
right around a 6 (either a little above or a little below). These states differ
from those ranked higher on the Polity IV scale primarily on three of the
14 indicators on used in this pilot study: competitiveness of participation
in governance, regulation of participation in governance, and breakdowns in
democratic governance. On the other indicators, their scores are the same
or substantially the same as ‘full’ democracies. Thinking about what the
components of democracy are, this suggests that democratic breakdowns
distinguish countries that have had them from countries that have not, even
among democracies. It also suggests that different levels of struggle with
competitiveness in participation have different significations for problems
with democracy. A fourth tetrahedron is formed by Russia, Congo Kin-
shasa, Mozambique, and Namibia. This tetrahedron has similar Polity IV
scores to the group that was just discussed, but fares less well on a number
of the indicators that we randomly selected. In the other data from the
Polity Dataset, there must be a counterbalance to these countries negative
scores not only on competitiveness and democratic breakdowns but also on
openness and regulation of competition.
Three more complex shapes also emerge, and are depicted in Figure 3.
The first is an octahedron formed by the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Colombia, Guyana, Georgia, and Sierra Leone. This is the figure to the left
in Figure 3. These countries match each other perfectly in regulation of
participation in executive elections, competitiveness of executive elections,
openness of executive elections, and the competitiveness of executive recruit-
ment. They exhibit small variations on competitiveness and regulation of
participation in elections. These traits make them closely related but not
collapsible into one data point. The six states differ on the existence of
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democratic breakdowns in their recent history, which is one of the factors
that creates space among them. What distinguishes this group as a group
from other democracies is imperfect scores on participation competitiveness
and regulation of executive recruitment so it is a group generally understood
to be democracies with particular weaknesses vis a vis certain indicators of
democracy.
The second more complex shape is an unnamed irregular polyhedron with
ten triangular faces, composed on Dominican Republic, Colombia, Bolivia,
Albania, Brazil , Solomon Islands, and Sierra Leone. This is the figure in
the center of Figure 3. It shares a triangular face with the octahedron on
the left. This means that the two are related, but not the same. This
shape includes three of the countries in the octahedron above, with four
different ones. While, in the octahedron, those countries (which score a 6
on both executive constraints indicators, that is, slightly more constrained
than not) are paired with countries that score a 5 (that is, in the middle
of the scale), in this irregular polyhedron, they are grouped with countries
that score a 7 on those same indicators. The combination of these shape-
relationships suggests that there is both a middle ground and a threshold
level for executive constraints that may be meaningful in the constitution
what makes a democracy.
The third more complex shape is unrelated to the first two. It is a trian-
gular bipyramid of Swaziland, Morocco, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. This
is the figure on the right of Figure 3. These states rank low on most of the
indicators of democracy that were included in our pilot study. That said,
their low scores vary and are substantially less low in the area of regulation
of participation in executive selection. In other words, these are countries
considered autocratic that lean more in the direction of democracy when
it comes to the clarity of rules of executive selection. While that does not
stop them from being classified as non-democracies, it does place them in a
group among those non-democracies distinguishable either from states with
mediocre scores on all of the indicators or those with low scores on all of the
indicators.
This is, of course, a very limited exploration of a few relationships be-
tween a few states on a few indicators over the course of one year. And
one might ask the advantage of this sort of analysis over just looking at
the states Polity IV score, or some other aggregation of these individual
indicators, rather than looking at indicators that are used to make com-
posite measures. After all, are composite measures not their composers full
definitions of democracy, and the (sometimes weighted) component parts
their understanding of the dimensionality? Would more information not be
gained by comparing composite measures, then? Certainly, such a compar-
ison would be fruitful, and is in our future plans.58 The information such
58We were able to use a very limited portion of this dataset here in part because of
incompatibilities across software about how to deal with missing data, and in part because
of the labor-intensive nature of the initial work plan. Currently, research assistants are
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Figure 3. Some 2-cycles in the 14-dimensional data. Note
that these are representations of the figures in 3-dimensional
space; the actual cycles are embedded in R
14
.
analysis would provide would be different, and no doubt an addition, as
would being able to use the other hundred indicators that we collected. The
nature of this pilot study and therefore the information it can provide is very
limited. It was able to show some contours of groups of states on the basis
of some commonality about particular indicators of democracy that may
serve as grouping, or even tipping, points. To know a meaning, much less
the meaning of democracy to IR scholars would require significantly more
in-depth analysis.
Yet such a project is well within the methodological capacity of this ap-
proach. For example, if composite measures are by definition a combination
of indicators flattened into one number, this sort of analysis can replicate
those composite measures in geometric analysis so that a composite score
means more than its statistical significance. It would then be possible to
group states based not only on their composite scores but on the indicators
on which they have the most similarity, or even on indicators on which states
with widely different composite numbers share common ground. Bending
those models over time can show complex configurations that may be indi-
cators of the change of form of a state. In other words, this sort of complex
mapping is capable of expanding the possibilities for categorization of states
among the multiple meanings of ‘democracy,’ and therefore of providing in-
sight into multiple ways in which the concept is (and could be) thought
about that are not always explicit in quantitative or qualitative analysis in
comparative politics and IR.
working on cleaning up the dataset for future work across other indicators, composite
measures, and over time.
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The biggest possible payoff in terms of looking at understandings of
democracy, however, is the next four possible steps. First, looking at the
data on democracy as abstract simplical complexes and examining the fil-
trations and barcodes that comes out of those constructions for the relation-
ships among states on indicators can provide a basis for multidimensional
mapping of indicators in relation to each other. In other words, it would
be possible to go beyond the positivist tendency to test collinearity in order
to look at the relationships among particular variables held to be indicators
of democracy both definitionally and as operationalized and applied in the
field. This could be done with existing data on democracy in the field of po-
litical science. A second step would be to compare the homological analysis
of the indicators, measures, and definitions of democracy in political science
to those used in the policy world using critical discourse analysis59 to collect
data from state policy statements, press releases, and leader quotes in news
publications. A third step could be comparing that to survey data collected
on the ground in a number of states around the world, where respondents
were asked about what democracy is, how you can tell that a democracy
exists, and whether neighboring states are democracies or not. A fourth
step could compare these concept maps to concept maps for other, related
but distinguishable, concepts, like those discussed by Doty, Zalewski and
Runyan, and Ashley.60
It is possible to be critical of these ideas for topological data analysis of
democracy in IR by asking what is going on here? Is it not just a hyperac-
tive process to critique (or even perfect) the positivist operationalization of
democracy? Certainly, these methods could be used to such an end, making
space for hypertechnical representations in regressions looking to figure out
how regime type influences foreign policy, or in predictions about the evo-
lutions of forms of state government. But that is neither our intent, nor, in
our view, the primary benefit of this methodological innovation.
Instead, we see the primary utility of an expansion of this sort of analysis
in Shapcotts understanding that democracy “must forever be questioning it-
self and the boundaries that it invokes.”61 Mapping meanings of democracy,
measurements of democracy, and comparisons on indicators of democracy in
multidimensional space can help us understand the ways that various con-
cepts are leveraged in favor of, and related to, certain notions of democracy,
as well as maps and relationships of inclusion and exclusion. If it is possible
to have some understanding of axes of rotation and points of engagement by
just looking at a few datapoints on a few indicators in one year, the analyti-
cal possibility of a full exploration mapping understandings of democracy is
almost unlimited. Such mappings could contribute not only to the analysis
59Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis (London:
Sage, 2009).
60See notes 42-45.
61Shapcott, Justice, Community, and Dialogue, p.68.
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of some of the specific how-possible questions above, but also to other ques-
tions yet unasked interested in relationships (tensions, similarities, and the
simultaneous presence of both) between different ways democracy is read in
global politics and in disciplinary IR.
The Potential Payoffs of Topological Analysis for Critical
IR
If the above formalizations of concept vectors, concept spaces, concept
topologies, and contexts are applicable to any concept in any theoretical
context (in the informal sense), why deploy them for use in poststructural-
ist IR? In other words, even if these methods could work for poststructuralist
analysis, and provide some value added, why use them? Is the value-added
enough? After all, even if the ontological and epistemological positions of
mathematical formalism and poststructuralist IR have commonalities, those
commonalities do not dictate the fruitfulness of the two working together.
While those commonalities (which we point out above) are the basis for our
claim that the two are compatible despite a general association of quanti-
tative work (of whatever flavor) and positivism, and poststructuralism with
qualitative methods, our argument that this analysis is usefully employed in
poststructuralist analysis is more based on the capacities that these sorts of
representations have that the tools traditionally available to poststructural-
ist scholars do not easily replace and/or replicate.
Particularly, we argue that there are three principal potential benefits to
the deployment of this methodology for poststructuralist IR. The first is that
the complex concept modeling can be used to reveal dimensions of concepts
(formally and informally) previously underexamined, either in mainstream
or in critical analysis. Thinking about the contours of concepts helps to
understand not only the ideas that go into them and/or their underlying
assumptions. If topological concept mapping can capture the complexity
of relations between features,62 then this provides a different way to think
about the underlying assumptions, building blocks, and inscriptions, and
fixings of meanings in poststructuralist terms. Multidimensional concept
modeling also provides a tool to think about the change of concepts over
time, over place, and in the ways that they are thought about either in the
discipline or in the policy world.
Second, and perhaps more interestingly, the tool of topological concept
mapping can be based in empirical and representative studies but is not
confined to them. That is, a model built to represent the dimensional-
ity of a concept can be studied with changes to that dimensionality to
see about potential changes in the concept. This serves the purposes of
emancipatory critical theorizing would the world be a better place if we
62See discussion in Aisbett and Gibbon, A General Formulation of Conceptual Spaces,
p.217.
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thought about things differently? It also serves the purposes of poststruc-
turalist critical theorizing how do concept structures become sticky and
reified? What would it look like to un-stick a particular dimension of a
concept? If concept mapping can be manipulated temporally,63 utilized to
analyze transitional effects,64 tessellated to unpack the relations between
different compiled meanings,65 morphologized to explore metaphorical re-
lationships,66 and translated to fuzzy geometry to understand liminality,67
there is significant potential for developing critical analysis of what global
politics is, how it is possible, and how it is constituted, reified, and per-
formed.
This could be done in a way that emphasizes relative relationality which,
in our view, is the third major potential payoff for critical theorizing. While
the descriptors for conceptual relationships are limited in terms of the sorts
of relationships we can think about in between, close to, far from, etc; the
topological descriptors are in theory both unlimited, and more clearly speci-
fiable (given the potential for multidimensionality). In fact, the complexity
both of representation and exploration is in theory unlimited. In practice, it
is limited only by the possible accessibility of time and information, and the
possible specification of data points. Neither of these limits is concerning,
though, given that even the least complex representations have potential
exploratory value if not empirical value.
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